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COMMENTARY: THE RULES OF LAW AND
THE POINT OF LAW
THOMAS MORAWETZt
H.,.A. Hart's book, The Concept of Law,1 is a description of the
kinds of rules which are characteristic of a legal system and which
give it its structure. Ronald Dworkin has argued that such an account
of the concept of law is, in important ways, mistaken because law
encompasses "standards that do not function as rules, but operate
differently as principles, policies, and other sorts of standards."2
I shall attempt to evaluate Dworkin's criticism, but I shall not
do so directly. I shall first ask what would count in a very general way
as a satisfactory analysis of a rule-structured activity like law-what
kinds of questions such an analysis must answer. Such an investigation,
if carried forward with moderate success, would allow us to ask whether
Hart's analysis satisfactorily answers these questions. If it is not satis-
factory, we can ask how it can be made satisfactory and whether these
changes are of the sort that Dworkin recommends.
I. THE NATURE OF OPEN AND CLOSED PRACTICES
According to John Rawls, a practice is any "form of activity sped-
fled by a system of rules ... which gives the activity its structure." 3
To say this is to distinguish between activity which merely occurs
regularly or as a rule, and activity which is governed by rules. Hart's
example is that if most members of a community go to the movies on
Friday night, it is proper to say that they go to the movies on Friday
as a rule, or that they are in the habit of going to the movies. But it is
not the case that they are following a rule in going to the movies, nor
is it the case that their activity constitutes a practice. Stopping cars at
red lights, on the other hand, may be something individuals do as a rule,
or are in the habit of doing, but to say this is ordinarily inadequate or,
worse, misleading. It is misleading because they are also following a
rule and thereby are involved in a practice.4
This distinction can be clarified as follows. An external observer
t Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Yale University. A.B. 1963, Harvard University;
M. Phil., LL.B., 1968, Ph.D., 1969, Yale University.
I H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
2 Dworkin, Is Law a System of Rules?, in ESSAYS 3N LEGAL PmosoP:Y 25, 34 (R.
Summers ed. 1968).
3 Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PinrosoPmcAL REv. 3 n.1 (1955).
4 See H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 9-13.
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may record the frequency of movie-attending behavior and the fre-
quency of stopping-at-red-light behavior. He may, moreover, record
the kinds of reactions which follow deviations from set patterns, and
he may be able to anticipate sequences of behavior and response with
a fair degree of accuracy. What he cannot do from an external stand-
point is to invoke a conceptual distinction between mere irregularities
in behavior and violations of rules. This distinction may be reflected
only in the attitudes participants take (internally) to deviations.
Participants within a practice invoke the rules as standards to describe
behavior which conforms to the rules and to criticize deviation. Failure
to go to the movies on Friday night is an irregularity which is not
usually described or criticized as a violation of a rule; failure to stop
at a red light will be seen not as a mere irregularity but as a violation
of a rule.5 One kind of rule violation is a mistake; mistakes are
attributable only in a context in which behavior is seen as rule-
governed. For example, one can be said to move the bishop wrongly
(rather than unusually) and thereby make a mistake in chess only
when the behavior of playing is seen as governed by the rules of chess.'
Thus, the idea of a practice cannot be understood without the idea
of a rule. The idea of a rule introduces a distinction between mere
irregularities of behavior and violation of rules, and it allows us to
refer to rules as standards which participants themselves employ.
I would like to distinguish between two kinds of practices, open
and closed practices. Chess and baseball are closed practices. Roughly,
a closed practice is one in which each instantiation (each game, for
example) has an explicit beginning and end. Participants qualify as
participants when they are familiar with all the rules of the practice
which define moves, positions, goals, etc., rules which can be given
more or less exhaustively and are constitutive of the practice. During
a game, these rules are fixed. Without having violated rules, the
participants are ordinarily in an adversary situation, and the constitu-
tive rules specify, among other things, the goal or goals of the partici-
pants. I do not want to say, however, that all games are closed practices
or that all closed practices are games.
An open practice, and I shall argue that law is an open practice,
has none of these features. Participation is ordinarily open-ended, and
the rules of the practice are standing rules which govern on-going activ-
ity. Participants are not required to know the particular rules which
5 Id.
6 This distinction parallels Rawls' distinction between the summary conception of
rules and the practice conception of rules. A rule exists in the example of movie-going
only as a description of regular behavior. Rawls, supra note 3, at 19-30.
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define permissible moves and positions in order for them to qualify as
participants, and in fact they may not do so. Moreover, it may be im-
possible in principle to give an exhaustive and complete account of the
rules of the practice, either because they are unlimited in number or,
more importantly, because the set of rules is constantly evolving. The
practice may provide institutional ways in which rules can be changed.
Ordinarily in an open practice participants are not adversaries, although
an adversary situation may be created when a rule is violated.
Examples of open practices are particular legal systems and par-
ticular languages. Traffic rules and rules of grammar and usage are
standing rules. Stopping at a red light or using "table" in successful
communication are not moves within a game which has a formal begin-
ning and end. Further, no citizen and no user of English is expected
to know all the particular rules which govern behavior within the prac-
tice in order to be regarded as a participant. No exhaustive account
of the first-order rules of a legal system or of English can be given.
Even if such a listing could be given, the rules in their application
would be unlike those of chess or baseball because they have, as Hart
has argued, open texture. Rules of law have open texture if no state-
ment of them can anticipate every possible problematic application.'
Similarly, no statement of the rules of English can be anything but an
approximation of usage. Laws change, and there are even rules within
the practice which instruct officers of the practice how to make such
changes. Furthermore, law and language are both cooperative enter-
prises, at least as long as the rules are followed.
Using the rough distinction between closed and open practices,
I shall argue that certain features of closed practices are not present
in all practices, as Rawls seems to suggest. Rawls says that "the rules
of practices are logically prior to particular cases."" By this, he means
that the intelligibility of the very terms with which we describe an
activity presupposes the rules. "[G]iven any rule which specifies a
form of action (a move), a particular action which would be taken as
falling under this rule given that there is the practice would not be
described as that sort of action unless there was the practice."9
7See H.L.A. lAnT, supra note 1, at 123:
Particular fact-situations do not await us already marked off from each other,
and labelled as instances of the general rule, the application of which is in ques-
tion; nor can the rule itself step forward to claim its own instances. In all fields
of experience, not only that of rules, there is a limit, inherent in the nature of
language, to the guidance which general language can provide.
8 Rawls, supra note 3, at 25.
9 Id.
1973]
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Rawls draws examples from baseball; among them are "striking out,"
"stealing a base," "balking."
Rawis concludes that a player within a practice, qua player, can
have no authority to question
the propriety of following a rule in particular cases. To engage
in a practice, to perform those actions specified by a practice,
means to follow the appropriate rules. If one wants to do an
action which a certain practice specifies then there is no way
to do it except to follow the rules which define it. Therefore,
it doesn't make sense for a person to raise the question whether
or not a rule of a practice correctly applies to his case where
the action he contemplates is a form of action defined by a
practice. If someone were to raise such a question, he would
simply show that he didn't understand the situation in which
he was acting. 0
Rawls' example is again drawn from baseball. During a game a player
cannot ask to be permitted four strikes. Being at bat is a situation
defined by the practice, and it does not make sense for the player to
question whether the rules governing batting correctly apply to his case.
He can question the rule only when he is not a participant by suggest-
ing that the rules in general be changed to allow batters four strikes.
In a closed practice the constitutive rules anticipate all situations.
No situation can arise in which it is unclear whether a player ought to
be permitted four strikes. In other words, the rules of a closed practice
do not have open texture. 1 Moreover, the constitutive rules of a closed
practice make no provision for change, or, a fortiori, for criticism,
of the rules themselves within the practice. Thus, the suggestion that
a player be permitted four strikes cannot be made by a player within
the context of the practice and is meaningful only as a recommendation
for new constitutive rules.
In open practices none of this is true as a matter of course. Any
question whether a move is permitted in chess has an easy answer,
presupposes the rules, and is obviated by a knowledge of the rules.
On the other hand, a question whether a move is permitted in law
(for example, whether an ordinance forbidding mechanized transpor-
tation in a park forbids pogo sticks) may have no easy answer. What
is called for is an interpretation of the rules, and whatever guidelines
'Old. 26 (emphasis added).
11See note 7 supra. Throughout the discussion of closed and open practices, note
the distinction between a game of baseball and the game of baseball. A game of baseball
is an activity which is an instance of a closed practice. The game of baseball can be
regarded as an evolving institution over time in which the rules change, in which a
commissioner makes quasi-judicial decisions, etc. In this sense, it is like an open practice.
In referring to baseball as an example of a dosed practice, I have in mind the former
sense. It is clear that only the former sense is at issue in Rawls' article.
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are relevant to interpretation are also relevant to criticism and change.
To say that a participant may appeal, in questioning the traffic ordi-
nance, to guidelines other than the rules themselves, is to say that rules
are not constitutive of moves within law as they are of moves within
closed practices.
Rawls recognizes that a practice may provide for the change of
rules, but his analysis seems incomplete. He first says that "if one holds
an office defined by a practice then questions regarding one's actions
in this office are settled by reference to the rules which define the
practice."'12 Here, "officer" apparently designates anyone whose be-
havior is governed by the rules; questions regarding pitchers, batters,
and chess players are settled by reference to the rules. Raws continues,
"If one seeks to question these rules, then one's office undergoes a
fundamental change: one then assumes the office of one empowered to
change and criticize the rules, or the office of a reformer, and so on."' 3
Here, Rawls acknowledges that there may be.practices more complex
than chess, practices within which some rules confer a special kind of
authority on certain players-the authority to change and to criticize
the rules.1
4
But who are these officers and what is the nature of their authority?
They are not like umpires since umpires administer the rules but do
not change or criticize them. Are they like judges? A judge's role seems
to be both to administer and to interpret rules. Legislators too are
empowered to change and to create laws. But the substantive exercise
of such authority cannot consist of moves defined by existing rules. In
this sense, the reformer works in vacuo. At most, the rules which em-
power him and define his role set limitations and guidelines for his
conduct, such as acting in the public interest. But they do not inform
his behavior, as do the rules of a game; they do not determine what
counts as implementation of the public interest.
To summarize, I have tried to identify the nature of a practice
and to distinguish closed and open practices. A closed practice, like
chess or baseball, is adequately explicated in a full statement of its
constitutive rules. The rules do not change within the game and are
definitive for the evaluation of moves within a game. To criticize the
rules is to stand outside the practice and to recommend a new practice.
By contrast, within an open practice rules may be evaluated and
changed, and the considerations relevant to evaluation and change do
12 Rawls, supra note 3, at 28.
13 Id.
14 Rawls is clearly not referring to such decisionmaking officers of baseball as
umpires. Umpires are empowered only to apply rules, not to criticize or question them.
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not emanate from other rules. I shall next argue that these considera-
tions can be understood only as grounded in what I shall call the "point"
of the practice.
If we ask a chess player what the point of the game is, he may say
that the point is to checkmate the other player's king. Similarly, the
point of baseball is to score more runs than the other team. In each
case a rule of the game instructs the players how one wins. If we ask
a player to justify a move he has made, he may do one of two things.
If he thinks we are unfamiliar with the rules, he may cite the rule
which allows him to make his move. If he thinks we are familiar with
the rules, he may explain his strategy; he may explain the move in
relation to the rule which specifies the point of the game for players
in their roles as adversaries. The specification of the rules of chess or
baseball is at the same time the specification of the point of the game
in this sense.
On the other hand, the point of chess or baseball may be said to
be the exercise of skill, the enjoyment of playing, etc. This point is
nowhere specified in the rules. Described in this way, the point of the
game is a justification for playing. It is not a constitutive feature of
the game since a game of chess or baseball can be carried forward even
if the players do not enjoy it and even if they exercise little or no
particular skill.
What I wish to suggest about law as a practice, and about open
practices generally, is that the point (or goal) of the practice is, on the
one hand, not given in a specification of the rules, and yet must be
taken into account before the application of rules to moves can be
explained. The point of an open practice is like checkmating in chess
in that it determines the strategy with which particular moves are
made; it gives them their raison dWre. In what follows I shall use
the example of law to illustrate that an account of an open practice is
not complete once the rules are given; the point of the practice must
be given as well.' 5
II. THE POINT OF LAW
I suggested initially that an account of what is required for the
satisfactory analysis of a practice would help us evaluate Hart's anal-
ysis of law. I shall try to show that law, as an open practice, can be
understood-and specifically that the features which Dworkin identi-
15 The following section is an attempt to qualify and restrict the very general notion
of the point of law. It is irrelevant whether one holds that there is one point of law or
several complementary ones.
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fies can be understood-only if both the rules of law and the point of
law are taken into account. But what is the point of law? I shall not
defend a particular formulation of it, but I shall suggest how it might
be understood.
There is general agreement among legal philosophers that law is
(at least) a system of rules for ordering behavior and that some legal
rules are coercive and backed by sanctions. 6 Behavior which would
go unpunished in the absence of a legal order is punishable within the
legal order. Obvious examples are the taking of life and driving beyond
a certain speed. Of course, not all legal rules are of this sort . 7 Insofar
as it is coercive, law is different from such other practices as the English
language, chess and baseball. In all of these practices the existence of
the practice increases behavioral options; certain forms of behavior-
verbal communicating, playing baseball-become possible ipso facto
by virtue of the existence of the practice.
To say that the very existence of a practice creates new behavioral
options is to give a very rough justification of the practice, which is
not immediately available for coercive rules. It is available only if one
can say that by limiting a certain range of behavioral options, a greater
general good, otherwise unattainable, is made available to those whose
behavior is limited. Only the minimal limitation needed to secure the
greater good can be justified in this way.
The notion of justification in terms of the greater good encom-
passes not only material benefit but such values as justice and fairness.
The suggestion here, which I shall discuss more fully below, is that any
justification of a legal decision is formally justification in terms of the
general good. The enhancement of a special interest is justified only
insofar as it redounds to the general good.
It is now possible to formulate tentatively the point of law. The
point is to limit permissible human activity in a general way so as to
attain a greater general good that would otherwise be unattainable.
Law can be justified only if it is admitted that this kind of justification
can arise and that individuals can be benefited by limiting their options
-when such a limitation is general.'
Even if a justification of law will be of this sort, why must a
characterization of law include any justification at all? Why not say
16 See H.LA. HART, supra note 1, chs. II-V.
1 7 Rules which empower individuals to make contracts or wills are not properly re-
garded as coercive rules. See id. 27-41.
18 One who holds that there can be no justification for any infringement on human
freedom would hold that all legal systems are unjustified. See Rawls, Justice as Fairness,
67 PmmosopmncAL REv. 164 (1958). Rawls argues that rational, self-interested individuals
will recognize that a general limitation of the sort contemplated by law will be in their
best interest,
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that law is simply a system of rules, some of them coercive? The reason
is that this leaves unexplained the strategy of the players, the reasons
and justifications that they themselves give for moving as they do.
It is important to recall the difference between closed and open prac-
tices. In closed practices, the strategies of the players, their reasons
and justifications for moving, can be understood in terms of the rule
which specifies the point; for example, checkmating. In open practices
there is no such rule.
The point of law is reflected in the strategies of players, in the
reasons and justifications which are given. This may be seen by look-
ing briefly at the actual practice of citizens, legislatures and courts.
Consider the citizen obeying a traffic light. Under ordinary circum-
stances, he might explain his act by saying, "That's the law." If asked
to justify his act, he might say that without such a rule, highway safety
(an ingredient of social order) could not be realized. By the restriction
of a personal option, the general benefit of safe driving is made pos-
sible. This justification is a justification both of the general rule and
of each particular act which falls under it.19 Thus it is possible for
someone who is seeking urgent medical aid to argue that the traffic
law ought not to apply in his case because its point is not served. This
argument makes sense and it is very different from the suggestion of
a baseball player that he be permitted four strikes. (To say that the
argument makes sense is not to say that the law does not apply or
ought not to apply. It is to say that whether the law applies is for
those empowered to administer the law to decide, taking the point of
law as relevant to their decision.)
Secondly, consider a legislature passing on a statute which regu-
lates the sale of firearms. A basic justification of the law is that by
limiting the option of individuals to own firearms without regulation,
a greater good is secured for the whole community. A showing that the
community is in some way better off without such regulation, or a show-
ing that such a limitation goes beyond the minimal restriction needed
to secure the good, is tantamount to a showing that the law is unjustified.
Finally, if we consider the arguments which lawyers and courts
use to support, challenge and defend decisions, we will find them invok-
ing what Dworkin calls "principles, policies and other sorts of stan-
dards." In one of Dworkin's examples, a decision limiting the ability
of automobile manufacturers to limit their own liability by warranty
19 This is not to say that every feature of the law will stand in need of justification.
Some features may be arbitrary, as is the color at which one stops or the date on which
tax returns are due.
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in case of defect is justified by the argument that, on the whole, con-
sumers and public interests must be fairly treated. 0 An option created
within law itself, the freedom of manufacturers to contract, is limited
because such a limitation is necessary for the general good.
My argument should be qualified in five ways.
(1) The suggestion that the point of law is to limit permissible
human activity in a general way so as to bring about greater general
good than would otherwise be attainable should be tested as an attempt
to represent the general character of the reasons which are given-
by citizens, legislatures, lawyers, courts-to justify and criticize laws
and their applications. Regardless of whether my particular formulation
requires qualification, I am suggesting both that some characterization
can be given, i.e. that there is a point of law, and that the role of prin-
ciples as reasons can be understood only if there is a point of law which
they instantiate.
(2) I am not suggesting that every citizen would be able or likely
to justify law-obeying behavior in terms of the general good. But to
give no justification at all ("that's the law") is to open oneself to the
criticism that one has failed to consider for what justifiable reason one
is acting. Further, I am not suggesting anything about the relation be-
tween the relevant justifications participants might give and their
motivation for acting as they do. A fortiori, I am not saying anything
about motivation or individual purposes at all. The point of the law
and one's own point (or purpose) in following the law (helping one's
family or keeping out of trouble) may be different matters entirely.
(3) The general principle which I have called the point of law is
compatible with the existence of conflicting views about the general
good. Most disagreements about what ought to be law and about how
a particular law ought to be interpreted are framed as arguments about
what kinds of acts would secure the general good. Even laws which
seem hostile to the general principle (for example, Nazi expropriation
laws, laws of apartheid) are defended or justified in terms of some
such principle. Thus, the principle is an attempt to account for what
counts as justification or criticism of any law in any system; in that
sense what I have called "the point of law" belongs to the concept of
law.
(4) Can there be a legal system in which laws are not justified in
this way, in which, for example, they are simply oracular pronounce-
2 0 See Dworkin, supra note 2, passim. For purposes of argument, I take for granted
that Dworkin is correct on these points. The case in question is Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 387, 161 A.2d 69, 85 (1960).
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ments? If so, the so-called point of law is not really a necessary feature
of the concept of law.
This criticism mistakes the nature .of the present discussion, which
is not to give necessary features in the absence of which a practice
cannot be called "law." There may be practices with coercive rules
about which there is no satisfactory answer to "Is it law?" The sug-
gested hypothesis is one example. Another would be a system having
coercive rules but no rules specifying how to recognize valid law or
how to administer it." In this sense the concept of law is itself a
concept with open texture. There are no hard and fast rules for its
application to penumbral cases.
(5) It is important that the same kind of considerations are usu-
ally relevant in determining the application and interpretation of par-
ticular rules and in determining what rules the practice ought to include.
Law in its character as an open practice is different from a game, in
which moves are justified by appeal to rules, and the set of rules (the
game itself) is justified, if at all, by appeal to such different considera-
tions as display of skill, entertainment, etc., all of which are general
utilitarian considerations.
III. HART'S ANALYSIS OF LAW
Hart's analysis of law is an analysis in terms of rules. As we have
already seen, and as Hart argues, any analysis of a practice must begin
with the notion of rule-governed behavior, which is to be distinguished
from merely regular behavior.22 Moreover, Hart notes that law is a
practice in which at least some of the rules are coercive; they are rules
whereby "human beings are required to do or abstain from certain
actions, whether they wish to or not." 3 Hart calls these rules "primary
rules of obligation."
Hart recognizes that law includes more than coercive rules, in part
because legal coercion requires machinery for administration and en-
forcement, and he discusses the importance of "secondary" rules which
empower some participants to administer the law. "[T]hey provide
that human beings may by doing or saying certain things introduce
new rules of the primary type, extinguish or modify old ones, or in
various ways determine their incidence or control their operations. ' 24
Rules about making contracts, the formation of legislatures, and the
21See H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 114-20. In Hart's terminology this is the ques-
tion whether a legal system may have primary rules of obligation and no secondary rules.
Primitive systems of coercive social organization may be of this form. See also id. ch. I.
22 Text accompanying notes 3-6 supra.
23 H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 78-79.
24 Id. 79.
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conduct of courts are all of this sort. Since the set of primary rules
changes over time, there must be a criterion for the primary rules of
the practice. The special secondary rule which gives this criterion is
"the rule of recognition." A primary rule is valid if it meets the criterion
of the rule of recognition. The rule of recognition is what Dworkin
calls a "master rule" which distinguishes laws from other social stan-
dards.
Finally, Hart notes that the application of primary rules to situa-
tions is sometimes uncertain because laws have open texture. Those
empowered to interpret rules in these cases cannot merely have re-
course to the rules themselves in making their interpretation; they must
also make determinations with recourse to other (extralegal) considera-
tions.2 To say that judges have this power is simply to say that they
have discretion.
In general, Hart seems to analyze law as if it were a closed prac-
tice, since closed practices are adequately analyzed when their constitu-
tive rules are exhaustively given. Hart gives what he regards as an
adequate account of the kinds of rules that are distinctive of law. Yet
this is an incomplete portrait of law, while an account of chess in terms
of its rules would not be incomplete, because it fails to answer why
the players make the moves they make, what goals guide them, what
reasons and justifications they might give for their moves, and in what
way these reasons and justifications make sense. In chess an account
of the rules includes an account of the point of the activity so that these
questions are answered. In law, by Hart's own admission, these ques-
tions involve considerations not specified in the rules.
To analyze law as a closed practice is to analyze it as an oddly
defective closed practice-defective because its rules generate hard
cases. The wheels of the machine get stuck as they cannot get stuck
in baseball. Therefore, special technicians must be called in; their
expertise cannot be specified within the practice of law and consists in
something extralegal. They have discretion to exercise their delegated
powers. In regarding law as an open rather than a closed practice, we
consider the possibility that it is not defective at all. The possibility
is that at all levels of the on-going practice participants have recourse
not only to rules but to relevant purposes and goals of the practice.
This is not to say that Hart's analysis is incorrect as an analysis
of the kinds of rules that comprise law. But an adequate account of
legal rules is not necessarily an adequate account of the concept of law.
In particular, I am not suggesting that a rule which is valid by the rule
2 5 For Dworkin's discussion of this point, see Dworkin, supra note 2, at 44-94.
19731
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of recognition must meet some further test, specified by the point of
the practice. Valid laws may be said to violate the point of the practice,
and this gives the impetus for reform. The vulnerability of existing law
to criticism and modification inherently prevents law from becoming
the fixed system that is a closed practice.
IV. DWORKIN's RESPONSE TO HART
Dworkin's objections to Hart's theory are framed as objections to
positivism. I shall discuss Dworkin's objections before considering
briefly whether they are also objections to positivism.
The first of three challenged tenets of positivism is "that the law
of a community is distinguished from other social standards by some
test in the form of a master rule. ' 26 Dworkin notes that policies and
principles belong to law and that they have no place in Hart's system
of primary and secondary rules. This challenges the theory that the
rule of recognition is a criterion for all standards properly called "law."
I shall assume with Dworkin that principles cannot be brought
under the rule of recognition,17 and that principles play a role at all
levels of legal reasoning28 But nothing in Hart's analysis precludes
supplementation by the notion of the point of law and the principles
that flow from it. The rule of recognition is the criterion for legal rules
rather than for law. This recommendation does not greatly alter Hart's
program, a large part of which is to show that analyses of law as a
homogeneous set of primary rules are inadequate. In this he succeeds 9
Dworkin suggests that principles-unlike legal rules-J"are con-
troversial ... [and] numberless, and they shift and change so fast
that the start of our list would be obsolete before we reached the
middle. '80 This leaves their origin and character unintelligible and
leaves mysterious just why they count as justification. The mystery
evaporates if principles are seen as instantiations of the point of the
practice, relevant in legal decisions as vectors pointing to the common
purpose for which law exists.
Dworkin's second objection is derived from the first. He challenges
the theory of judicial discretion as a theory that once a judge has
exhausted all relevant legal rules, there are no further considerations
26 Id. 59.
27 It seems clear that Hart would agree that principles cannot be brought under the
rule of recognition.
28 See text accompanying note 20 supra.
29 For Hart's critique of John Austin's theory of jurisprudence, see HLA. HART,
supra note 1, at 1-76. Austin suggests that legal rules are homogeneous and may all be
seen as coercive rules; Hart's account of secondary rules corrects this defect in Austin's
theory.
30 Dworkin, supra note 2, at 58.
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binding upon his decisionmaking. If what I have argued is correct,
principles which represent the point of law are binding in the sense
Dworkin requires. He makes two points in support of this argument:
[N]ot any principle will do to justify a change, or no rule
would ever be safe. There must be some principles that count
and others that do not, and there must be some principles that
count for more than others. It could not depend on the judge's
own preferences amongst a sea of respectable extra-legal stan-
dards, any one in principle eligible, because if that were the
case we could not say that any rules were binding. We could
always imagine a judge whose preferences amongst extra-legal
standards were such as would justify a shift or radical re-
interpretation of even the most entrenched rule.
Second, any judge who proposes to change existing doc-
trine must take account of some important standards that
argue against departures from established doctrine, and these
standards are also for the most part principles. They include
the doctrine of 'legislative supremacy,' a set of principles and
policies that require the courts to pay a qualified deference to
the acts of the legislature. They also include the doctrine of
precedent .... 31
We have already seen that the relevance and importance of a
principle-the extent to which it is binding-cannot depend on the
judge's preferences. They depend on the relation of the principle to
the point of the practice, minimal coercion for the greater general
good. Such doctrines as stare decisis have general relevance because
it can always be argued that reliance on established practice is in the
general interest.
3 2
The third untenable tenet of positivism, according to Dworkin,
is the theory of legal obligation whereby "a legal obligation exists
when (and only when) an established rule of law imposes such an
obligation.... [I]n a hard case-when no such established rule can
be found-there is no legal obligation until the judge creates a new
rule for the future."13 This tenet follows from the identification of law
with a system of rules and from the identification of obligation with
the existence of particular primary (coercive) rules of obligation.
Again it is difficult to evaluate Dworkin's argument as a criticism
of Hart, even if the argument itself is granted. It is possible to agree
311d. 51-92.
32 The point of the practice can be seen as a criterion of relevance for suggested
principles just as the rule of recognition is a criterion of validity for suggested primary
rules. To show that a principle is relevant is to show that it refers to a social order in
which coercive (and other) rules exist only for the sake of the greater general good. It
seems that the point of the practice is a substantive limit on possible reasons and justifi-
cation, while the rule of recognition is a formal criterion.
83 Dworkin, supra note 2, at 59.
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with Hart that existing legal rules do impose obligations and still to
hold that law is not simply a matter of rules. Valid rules may be
criticized as bad law, as misrepresenting the point of law. To argue
this may be to suggest that the obligatory nature of an unjustified
rule is eroded, and that only justifiable rules impose obligations. If
this is true, the obligatory nature of rules does not follow simply from
their validity, as Hart suggests, but from their justifiability. On the
other hand, if Hart is saying merely that prima facie obligation and
justifiability attach to valid rules, this more cautious and tentative
position is not vulnerable to criticism in the same way.
To decide whether Dworkin's argument is a refutation of Hart,
one must decide how strong a position Hart takes. Let us call "strong"
the position that the rule of recognition is a master rule for all law,
that judges in hard cases cannot resolve cases by rule and are left
to their own preferences, and that any valid legal rule determines
obligation. Dworkin refutes this position. But if Hart holds that the
rule of recognition is the criterion for legal rules (rather than for all
of law), that judges in hard cases must appeal to principles (not to
their own preferences) rather than to legal rules which are themselves
ambiguous, and that legal rules are prima facie rules of obligation
(but not necessarily obligatory if they are bad law), then none of
Dworkin's three criticisms seems relevant to his position.
V. POSITMSM
Dworkin identifies the stronger position with positivism. If we
assume arguendo that Hart holds the weaker position, and argue that
this analysis of legal rules must be supplemented by an account of
the point of the practice to compose an adequate account of the prac-
tice, is this composite account still a kind of positivism?
In an explanatory note in The Concept of Law, Hart lists five
views, all of which appear in contemporary Anglo-American juris-
prudence, as "positivism."3 4 With regard to each, I shall ask whether
either Hart's view or the composite view is positivism.
(1) "Laws are commands of human beings." This view, accord-
ing to Hart, presupposes that rules are homogeneous and fails to give
an adequate account of the role of secondary rules." Hart's view and
the composite view are not positivism in this sense.
(2) "There is no necessary connexion between law and morals,
or law as it is and law as it ought to be." A law may be valid law
4 H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 253.
35 See id. 1-76.
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even if criticized as bad law, as betraying or undercutting the point
of the practice. In this sense, both Hart's view and the composite view
are positivistic.
(3) "The analysis or study of meanings of legal concepts is an
important study to be distinguished from (though in no way hostile
to) historical inquiries, sociological inquiries, and the critical appraisal
of law in terms of morals, social aims, functions, &c." In this fairly
trivial sense, Hart's view and the composite view are both positivistic,
insofar as they are attempts to provide a study of meanings.
(4) "A legal system is a 'closed logical system' in which correct
decisions can be deduced from predetermined legal rules by logical
means alone." Neither view is positivistic in this sense. Hart recognizes
open texture, and the composite view explains open texture by the fact
that law is an open and not a closed practice.
(5) "Moral judgments cannot be established, as statements of
fact can, by rational argument, evidence or proof." Neither theory
takes a stand on this question.
It follows that the composite or amended theory is neither more
nor less positivistic than Hart's theory. The composite theory, more-
over, explains those features of law which Hart's analysis, taken only
as an analysis of legal rules, leaves inchoate. Dworkin correctly ob-
jects that these features require explanation.
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